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The study of societies of adaptive agents seeking minority status is an active area of research.
Recently, it has been demonstrated that such systems display an intriguing phase-transition: agents
tend to self-segregate or to cluster according to the value of the prize-to-fine ratio, R. We show that
such systems do not establish a true stationary distribution. The winning-probabilities of the agents
display temporal oscillations. The amplitude and frequency of the oscillations depend on the value
of R. The temporal oscillations which characterize the system explain the transition in the global
behavior from self-segregation to clustering in the R < 1 case.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of complex systems is a growing area of re-
search. A problem of central importance in biological and
socio-economic systems is that of an evolving population
in which individual agents adapt their behavior according
to past experience. Of particular interest are situations in
which members (usually referred to as ‘agents’) compete
for a limited resource, or to be in a minority (see e.g., [1]
and references therein.) In financial markets for instance,
more buyers than sellers implies higher prices, and it is
therefore better for a trader to be in a minority group of
sellers. Predators foraging for food will do better if they
hunt in areas with fewer competitors. Rush-hour drivers,
facing the choice between two alternative routes, wish to
choose the route containing the minority of traffic [3].
Considerable progress in the theoretical understanding
of such systems has been gained by studying the simple,
yet realistic model of the minority game (MG) [4], and
its evolutionary version (EMG) [1] (see also [5–13] and
references therein). The EMG consists of an odd number
of N agents repeatedly choosing whether to be in room
“0” (e.g., choosing to sell an asset or taking route A)
or in room “1” (e.g., choosing to buy an asset or taking
route B). At the end of each round, agents belonging to
the smaller group (the minority) are the winners, each of
them gains R points (the “prize”), while agents belonging
to the majority room lose 1 point (the “fine”). The agents
have a common “memory” look-up table, containing the
outcomes of m recent occurrences. Faced with a given
bit string of recent m occurrences, each agent chooses
the outcome in the memory with probability p, known
as the agent’s “gene” value (and the opposite alternative
with probability 1−p). If an agent score falls below some
value d, then its strategy (i.e., its gene value) is modified
(One can also speaks in terms of an agent quitting the
game, allowing a new agent to take his place.) In other
words, each agent tries to learn from his past mistakes,
and to adjust his strategy in order to survive.
Early studies of the EMG were restricted to simple
situations in which the prize-to-fine ratio R was assumed
to be equal unity (see however [6]). A remarkable con-
clusion deduced from the EMG [1] is that a population
of competing agents tends to self-segregate into opposing
groups characterized by extreme behavior. It was real-
ized that in order to flourish in such situations, an agent
should behave in an extreme way (p = 0 or p = 1) [1,2].
On the other hand, in many real life situations the
prize-to-fine ratio may take a variety of different values
[14]. A different kind of strategy may be more favorite
in such situations. In fact, we know from real life situ-
ations that extreme behavior is not always optimal. In
particular, our daily experience indicates that in difficult
situations (e.g., when the prize-to-fine ratio is low) hu-
man people tend to be confused and indecisive. In such
circumstances they usually seek to do the same (rather
than the opposite) as the majority.
Based on this qualitative expectation, we have recently
extended the exploration of the EMG to generic situa-
tions in which the prize-to-fine ratio R takes a variety
of different values. It has been shown [14] that a sharp
phase transition exist in the model: “confusion” and “in-
decisiveness” take over in times of depression (for which
the prize-to-fine ratio is smaller than some critical value
Rc), in which case central agents (characterized by p =
1
2
)
perform better than extreme ones. That is, for R < Rc
agents tend to cluster around p = 1
2
(see Fig. 1 in [14])
rather than self-segregate into two opposing groups.
In this paper we provide an explanation for the global
behavior of agents in the EMG. The model is based on
the fact that the population never establishes a true sta-
tionary distribution. In fact, the probability of a par-
ticular agent to win, τ(p), is time-dependent. This fact
has been overlooked in former studies of the EMG. The
winning-probability oscillates in time: the amplitude and
frequency of the oscillations depend on both the value of
the prize-to-fine ratio R and on the agent’s gene value p.
The smaller the value of R the larger is the oscillation
amplitude. In addition, “extreme” agents (with p = 0, 1)
have an oscillation amplitude which is larger than the
corresponding amplitude of “central” agents (those with
p = 1
2
).
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We show that in the R > Rc case these oscillations
are used by extreme agents to cooperate indirectly and
to share the system’s resources efficiently. On the other
hand, when R < Rc agents cannot afford to share the
limited resources. They tend to cluster around p = 1
2
,
preventing any possibility of cooperation.
II. TEMPORAL OSCILLATIONS OF THE
WINNING-PROBABILITIES
A partial explanation for the (steady state) gene-
distribution is given in [7]. It has been found that the
probability τ(p) of an agent with a gene-value p to win
is given by:
τ(p) = 1/2− αp(1− p) , (1)
where α < 1 is a constant (which depends on the number
of agents N). This result is used to explain the better
performance of extreme agents as compared to central
ones, which leads to the phenomena of self-segregation
[7]. However, the analytic model presented in [7] can-
not explain the phase transition (from self-segregation to
clustering) observed in the exact model [14].
In Figure 4 of [14] we have displayed the time-
dependence of the average gene value, <p>, for different
values of the prize-to-fine ratio R. It has been demon-
strated that the distribution P (p) oscillates around p =
1
2
. The smaller the value of R, the larger are the am-
plitude and the frequency of the oscillations. Thus, we
conclude that a population which evolves in a tough en-
vironment never establishes a steady state distribution.
Agents are constantly changing their strategies, trying to
survive. By doing so they create global currents in the
gene space.
The temporal oscillations of <p> induce larger oscilla-
tions in the winning-probabilities τ(p) of the agents. In
Fig. 1 we display the temporal dependence of τ(p = 0)
and τ(p = 1
2
) for R = 1. Figure 2 displays the same
quantities for the case of R = 0.8. Both figures are pro-
duced from exact numerical simulations of the the EMG.
We find that when <p> is even slightly higher than 1
2
,
τ(p = 0) (the winning-probability of an agent who acts
against the global memory outcome) is almost unity.
It should be emphasized that the winning probability
of a central agent, τ(1
2
), displays only mild oscillations.
For a central agent (characterized by p ≃ 1
2
) it is basically
irrelevant which room is more probable to win in the next
round of the game. In either case, his winning-probability
is approximately 1
2
. In other words, the global gene-
distribution of the population has a larger influence on
extreme agents as compared to central ones.
It is evident from Figs. 1 and 2 that the amplitude and
the frequency of the oscillations increase as the value of
the prize-to-fine ratio R, decreases. It is important to
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FIG. 1. Temporal dependence of the winning probabilities
for R = 1. The results are for N = 10001 agents, and d = −4.
τ (p = 0) oscillates in time, with an amplitude of ∼ 0.3, while
τ (p = 1
2
) is practically constant (∼ 0.5) in time. The period
of the oscillations is about 40 time steps.
note that Eq. (1) [7] is valid only for a stationary distri-
bution of the gene-values. However, we have shown that
the steady-state assumption is only marginally justified
for R = 1, and far from being correct for smaller values
of the prize-to-fine ratio R.
To better quantify the temporal oscillations of the win-
ning probabilities, we display in Fig. 3 the corresponding
Fourier transforms in the frequency domain. One finds
that the transform becomes sharper as the prize-to-fine
ratio decreases (i.e., the oscillations are better character-
ized by a pure, well-defined frequency). Figure 4 displays
the dependence of the oscillations period (according to
the peak of the transform) and their amplitude on the
prize-to-fine ratio R. The period of the oscillations de-
creases with decreasing value of R, while the amplitude
of the oscillations increases with decreasing value of R.
We now provide a qualitative explanation for the tem-
poral oscillation which characterize the system. Consider
for example a situation in which <p>< 1
2
at a particular
instant of time. In these circumstances, the winning-
probability of an agent with a gene value p > 1
2
is larger
than 1
2
(this is due to the fact that most agents are
located in the opposite half of the gene-space, and are
therefore making decisions which are opposite to his de-
cision). At the same time, agents with p < 1
2
have a
small winning-probability, and they are therefore losing
points on the average. Eventually, the scores of some of
these agents fall below d, in which case they modify their
strategy. The new gene-values which are now joining the
system lead to a global current of gene-values from the
p < 1
2
side of the gene space to the p > 1
2
side. This
increases the value of <p>, and eventually the system
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FIG. 2. Temporal dependence of the winning probabilities
for R = 0.8. The parameters are the same as in Fig. 1.
τ (p = 0) oscillates in time, with the maximally possible am-
plitude of ∼ 0.5, while τ (p = 1
2
) is practically constant (∼ 0.5)
in time. The period of the oscillations is about 10 time steps.
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Frequency (1/step)
Am
pl
itu
de
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
Frequency (1/step)
Am
pl
itu
de
R=1 
R=0.8 
FIG. 3. Fourier transforms of the winning probabilities in
the frequency domain for R = 1 (top panel) and R = 0.8
(bottom panel). The parameters are the same as in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 4. Dependence of the oscillations period (solid line)
and the amplitude (dashed line) of the winning probabilities
on the value of the prize-to-fine ratio R. The parameters are
the same as in Fig. 1.
will cross from <p>< 1
2
to <p>> 1
2
. It must be real-
ized that the reaction of the system to this transition is
not immediate. Agents with p > 1
2
are quite wealthy
at this point (they had large winning-probabilities in the
last few rounds). Thus, even tough they start to lose
(due to the fact that most of the population is now con-
centrated in their half of the gene space) they do not
modify their gene-values immediately. At the same time,
some of the survived agents with p < 1
2
are quite vul-
nerable (after losing in the last few turns), implying that
one wrong choice could drive their score below d, forcing
them to change strategy. In other words, immediately
after the crossing from <p>< 1
2
to <p>> 1
2
, agents
with p < 1
2
are still more likely to change their strat-
egy. Thus, the average gene value continues to increase.
Eventually, agents with p > 1
2
(the ones who now have
poor winning-probabilities) lose enough times and start
to modify their strategy. This will drive the average gene
value back towards <p>= 1
2
. This periodic behavior re-
peats itself again and again, producing the temporal os-
cillations which characterize the system.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TEMPORAL
OSCILLATIONS
The main feature which characterizes the system’s
behavior is the temporal oscillation of the winning-
probability. In order to capture this effect we consider
two types of agents: agent A whose winning-probability
alternates repeatedly between 1 and 0, and agent B whose
winning-probability, q, is constant in time. Agent A
represents an extreme agent (p = 0, 1) whose winning-
probability oscillates in time, while agent B represents a
central agent (p = 1
2
) whose winning probability is prac-
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tically constant in time (see Figs. 1 and 2), and is slightly
less than 1
2
[7].
The two types of agents differ in the standard devia-
tion of their success rate, a fact which dictates a different
mean life span. Consider for example, the simple case of
R = 0 and d = −1. The mean life span of player A is 1 1
2
rounds (averaging over the two situations: starting the
game with a victory, or losing in the first round of the
game). The probability of agent B to change his strategy
after n rounds is qn−1(1 − q), and his mean life span is
therefore given by
∑
∞
0
nqn−1(1− q). This equals ∼ 1.98
for q = 0.495 (this value of q is taken from the R = 1
case). Thus, agent B has a longer mean life span. This
conclusion is in agreement with the results of the full
non-linear model (the EMG), in which it was demon-
strated that under tough conditions (R < Rc) central
agents perform better than extreme ones (note that this
is despite the fact the the average winning probability of
a central agent is less than that of an extreme agent).
On the other hand, for R = 1 agent A has an infinite life
span, while agent’s B lifespan is finite. Again, this is in
agreement with the results of the full non-linear model,
according to which extreme agents (with large temporal
oscillations in their winning-probability) live longer than
central ones in the R > Rc case.
Figure 5 displays the average lifespan of agents A and
B as a function of the prize-to-fine ratio R. We find that
the simplified toy model provides a fairly good qualita-
tive description of the complex system. In particular,
in the R = 1 case agent A (the extreme one) performs
better (with a longer mean lifespan) than agent B (the
central one), in agreement with the fact that the popula-
tion tends to self-segregate into opposing groups charac-
terized by extreme behavior [1]. On the other hand, for
R < Rc agent A performs worse, in agreement with the
finding [14] that in times of depression the population
tends to cluster around p = 1
2
.
The simplified model can explain another interesting
feature of the full EMG: it was found in [14] that the
relative concentration [P (0) : P (1
2
)] of agents around p =
0 (and p = 1) in the R = 1 (R > Rc) case is larger than
the relative concentration [P (1
2
) : P (0)] of agents around
p = 1
2
in the R = 0.971 (R < Rc) case (see Fig. 1 of
[14]). This result can be explained by the fact that the
lifespan difference between the various agents is larger in
the R = 1 case as compared with the R < Rc case (see
Fig. 5).
It should be realized that in order to have a long av-
erage lifespan in the R > Rc case, it is best not to take
unnecessary risks. An agent who plays with a constant
(i.e., time independent) winning probability (agent B)
takes the risk of losing more times than he wins (and
this may derive his score below d). The average life span
of agent B is therefore shorter than the corresponding
average life span of agent A who wins and loses exactly
the same number of times.
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FIG. 5. The life spans of agents A and B as a function
of the prize-to-fine ratio R. d = −4. Agent A wins once
every second round of the game. Agent B has a constant
winning-probability of 0.495.
On the other hand, in the R < Rc case, agents must
take risks in order to survive. An individual agent can-
not afford himself to win and lose the same number of
times (since the fine is larger than the prize). In order to
survive under harsh conditions an agent must win more
times than he lose. Thus, in such conditions (R < RC)
agent B has a longer average life span as compared with
agent A (Playing with a constant winning probability is
the best strategy to achieve more winnings than loses.)
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we have considered a semianalytical
model of the evolutionary minority game with an arbi-
trary value of the prize-to-fine ratio R. The main results
and their implications are as follows:
(1) The winning-probabilities of the agents display
temporal-oscillations. The smaller the value of the prize-
to-fine ratio R, the farther the system is from a steady-
state distribution (the larger is the amplitude of the oscil-
lations). Extreme agents (ones with p = 0, 1) have larger
oscillations in their winning probability as compared with
central (p = 1
2
) agents. Thus, extreme agents are sen-
sitive to the global gene-distribution of the population
(their winning-probabilities display large temporal oscil-
lations), while central agents have an almost constant
(time-independent) winning probability (∼ 1
2
).
(2) In the R > Rc case the population tends to self-
segregate into opposing groups. The winning probabilities
of these two groups oscillate in time in such a way that
each group wins and lose approximately the same number
of times. The efficiency of the system is therefore max-
imized due to the fact that at each round of the game
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one of the groups (containing approximately half of the
population) wins. Thus, by self-segregation into two op-
posing groups, the agents cooperate indirectly to achieve
an optimum utilization of their resources.
On the other hand, in the R < Rc case an individ-
ual agent cannot afford himself to win and lose the same
number of times. In order to survive under harsh condi-
tions (R < Rc) an agent must win more times than he
lose. Thus, in a tough environment agents cannot coop-
erate (not even indirectly) by self-segregating into two
opposing groups. Rather, they tend to cluster around
p = 1
2
. Playing with a constant (i.e., time-independent)
winning probability (∼ 1
2
) provides an individual agent
with the best chance to win more times than he loses [an
extreme agent on the other hand (with large oscillations
in his winning probability) wins and loses approximately
the same number of times]. Note that while playing with
a constant winning probability is the only way to survive
in a tough environment (the only way to win more times
than losing), it is also the riskiest strategy: such an agent
takes the risk of losing more times than he wins.
The clustering phenomena creates a situation in which
the population as a whole is not organized. Due to statis-
tical fluctuations, the average number of winners at each
round of the game is less than half of the population,
implying a low efficiency of the system as a whole.
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